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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
PROPERTY DIVISIONS AT DIVORCE 
 
By Margaret Ryznar* 
 
Abstract 
Much has been written about family law and how to fairly 
divide property between divorcing spouses.  Without a good 
understanding of what courts are doing in the field, however, 
there is no baseline for theoretical frameworks.  This Article fills 
the void by analyzing all divorce cases involving children that 
were filed in one county over several months.  The resulting 
empirical data has implications for the meaning of fairness in 
divorce, the role of judicial discretion, and the incentives for 
contracting by couples.  This Article also examines the 
underlying law in order to explore the correlation between the 
family law code and judicial outcomes. 
 
  
1
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Each year, nearly two million people divorce in the United 
States, and over four million marry.1  They have kids, and if 
nothing else, they venture into romantic relationships.  Yet, 
they know little about the family laws that pick up the pieces of 
broken relationships and set the price of love.  One woman did 
not even know that a divorce would end her marriage.2  While 
that may be extreme, most people do not know that the law 
treats non-married couples like strangers, and many engaged 
couples think they have no chance of divorce—but nothing 
could be further from the truth.3 
In a grey universe such as family law, where discretionary 
standards govern factually diverse cases, little can be 
measured.4  This makes it more difficult for courts, 
 
 *Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University McKinney School of 
Law.  Many thanks to Susan David deMaine and Jessica Dickinson for their 
excellent research assistance, as well as to Heather Kinser, Jordan Porter, 
Sarah Thurman, and Ne’Cole Whyde.  Thanks also to Margaret Brinig for her 
invaluable assistance and Pace Law Review for editing assistance.  This 
project was generously supported by a Research Support Funds Grant 
(RSFG) from IUPUI. 
1.  National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm (last visited Mar. 
22, 2017). 
2.  Tomas Jivanda, Woman Claims Lawyers Should Have Told Her 
Divorce Would End Her Marriage, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/woman-claims-lawyers-
should-have-told-her-divorce-would-end-her-marriage-9051550.html. 
3.  SONIA HARRIS-SHORT & JOANNA MILES, FAMILY LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 109 (2d ed. 2011); Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: 
Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, 
and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 757 (2009). 
4.  “[S]cholars and lawmakers have recognized that litigating under 
open-ended, amorphous standards [in family law] is unpredictable . . . .”  
Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2003, 2006 (2014).  The field of family law is certainly no stranger to 
greyness.  See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in 
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1167 
(1986) (“Family law . . . is characterized by more discretion than any other 
field of private law.”).  In fact, the two major inquiries when a marriage ends 
relate to the division of property and child-related matters such as child 
custody and support.  The latter is governed by the notoriously ambiguous 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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policymakers, lawmakers, and litigants to know what to do in a 
particular case. 
Thus, this Article offers an empirical analysis of one set of 
data, which shows the actions of the courts and the outcomes 
for divorcing couples.  Analyzing approximately 110 divorce 
cases filed over three months in 2008 in Marion County, this 
Article focuses on property divisions, specifically those of 
pensions and marital homes, which are the most significant 
assets that couples own.5  In regards to these, this Article looks 
at the mandates of the Indiana legislature on property division 
and to what extent the courts are following them.  Accordingly, 
Part II sets forth the Indiana legal framework against which 
divorces occur.  Part III analyzes the data to examine how the 
courts are working within this legal framework.  There may be 
a divergence between theory and practice, and empirical 
research measures it.  The resulting empirical data has 
implications for the meaning of fairness in divorce, the role of 
judicial discretion, and the incentives and background for 
contracting by couples. 
 In many ways, Indiana is representative of other state 
approaches to property division.6  For example, Indiana takes 
the majority approach of equitable distribution as opposed to 
community property.7  Thus, the lessons learned from an 
 
“child’s best interests,” while the former is governed by fairness.  See, e.g., 
William J. Howe & Hugh McIssac, Finding the Balance: Ethical Challenges 
and Best Practices for Lawyers Representing Parents when the Interests of 
Children are at Stake, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 78, 78-79 (2008) (“Virtually every 
jurisdiction . . . seeks to achieve the best interests of the child when resolving 
divorce, custody, or parenting disputes.”); Marsha Garrison, What’s Fair in 
Divorce Property Distribution: Cross-National Perspectives from Survey 
Evidence, 72 LA. L. REV. 57, 58 (2011) (“All divorce property-distribution 
systems aim to achieve a fair division of spousal assets.”). 
5.  D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 
614 (2016) (“In addition to the marital home, pension benefits constitute the 
most significant marital asset for many couples.  They also serve as an 
important source of funds for meeting support obligations.”). 
6.  However, state law governs divorce, making any generalization 
difficult.  See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (“Rules governing 
the inheritance of property, adoption, and child custody are generally 
specified in statutory enactments that vary from State to State.  Moreover, 
equally varied state laws governing marriage and divorce affect a multitude 
of parent-child relationships.”). 
7.  See infra Part II.B. 
3
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empirical analysis of Indiana apply to other states and are 
essential given that in Indiana, as anywhere, the division of 
property is among the biggest issues when a couple divorces.8  
With continued high levels of divorce in the United States and 
around the world, it is important to study this area of law, 
particularly in respect to two significant implications. 
First, the family law conversation has moved on from the 
question of unilateral or fault divorce, and now divorces occur 
freely, raising the question of what is fair in the property 
division at divorce.9  Second, there has been a trend towards 
reducing family law to formulae, as seen in the child support 
guidelines and parenting time guidelines, but there are limits 
to this in the property division realm.10 
 
II.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Even statutorily, before the facts of a particular case 
muddy the equation, property division is notoriously grey.  
While other areas of law have clear guidelines to assist courts 
in reaching their decisions, a common guideline in divorce 
property division is the ambiguous notion of fairness. 
To facilitate fairness, property division often proceeds in 
two stages.  The first is applying state law to determine the 
assets to be divided, which is generally governed by state 
statutory law.11  The second is the actual division of assets 
 
8.  “The fact that not just specialists and dedicated proponents, but also 
broad swaths of scholars, courts, and decisionmakers, are grappling with 
data is a sign of the empirical revolution’s vitality.”  Daniel E. Ho & Larry 
Kramer, Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
1195, 1202 (2013). 
9.  See, e.g., Mirenda Watkins, Divorce, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1033 
(2006) (exploring contemporary issues in divorce). 
10.  “Even if the contested issues in a divorce are limited to child custody 
and visitation, statutory child support guidelines and shared parenting 
requirements usually come into play.”  Debra Berman & James Alfini, 
Lawyer Colonization of Family Mediation: Consequences and Implications, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 887, 912 (2012). 
11.  These statutes vary among the states.  For example, the relevant 
Illinois statute divides only marital property.  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/503(a)-(b) (2017).  Furthermore, there is a rebuttable presumption that 
property acquired during marriage is marital property that is divisible upon 
divorce.  Id.  Finally, property gained before marriage or by gift does not 
qualify as marital property.  Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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under state law,12  with debts often treated the same way as 
assets.13  If enforced by the court, a valid premarital agreement 
may change this framework.14 
Indiana is no different: 
 
[T]he law governing the division of marital 
property . . . is a two-step process in Indiana.  
First, the trial court determines what property 
must be included in the marital estate.  It is well 
established that all marital property goes into 
the marital pot for division, whether it was 
owned by either spouse before the marriage, 
acquired by either spouse after the marriage and 
before final separation of the parties, or acquired 
by their joint efforts.  This “one-pot” theory 
ensures that all assets are subject to the trial 
court’s power to divide and award.  While the 
trial court may ultimately determine that a 
particular asset should be awarded solely to one 
spouse, it must first include the asset in its 
consideration of the marital estate to be divided.  
After determining what constitutes marital 
property, the trial court must then divide the 
marital property under the presumption that an 
equal split is just and reasonable.  This 
presumption may be rebutted by a party who 
presents relevant evidence . . . .15 
 
12.  See Margaret Ryznar, All’s Fair in Love and War: But What About 
in Divorce? The Fairness of Property Division in American and English Big 
Money Divorce Cases, 86 N.D. L. REV. 115 (2010).  The relevant Illinois 
statute is typical in listing the factors that courts should consider when 
dividing marital property.  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(a)-(b) (2017). 
13.  See, e.g., Capehart v. Capehart, 705 N.E.2d 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) 
(noting that the husband’s premarital educational debt should have been 
included in the marital pot, but the fact that it was premarital rebutted the 
presumption of equal division). 
14.  The premarital agreement must be substantively and procedurally 
fair.  See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar & Anna Stepień-Sporek, To Have and To 
Hold, For Richer or Richer: Premarital Agreements in the Comparative 
Context, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 27 (2009). 
15.  Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) 
(citations omitted).  See also Love v. Love, 10 N.E.3d 1005, 1013 (Ind. Ct. 
5
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Each of these steps is considered next in turn. 
 
A.  Defining Property Subject to Division 
The threshold question of any property division is the 
definition of property.16  The Indiana Code provides some 
guidance, as does Indiana case law.17  The most important 
division for many people is that of the marital house, which is 
often the most significant asset that people own other than 
their retirement accounts. 
 
  
 
App. 2014) (“It is well-established that all marital property goes into the 
marital pot for division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the 
marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before final 
separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts.”).  See also Hartley 
v. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), which states: 
In determining the value of the marital estate, the trial 
court is required to include property owned by either spouse 
before the marriage, acquired by either spouse in his or her 
own right after the marriage and before final separation of 
the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts. This “one-pot” 
theory insures that all assets are subject to the trial court’s 
power to divide and award. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
16.  See, e.g., O’Connell v. O’Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008) (“First, the trial court determines what property must be included in 
the marital estate.”).  For example, in Indiana, pets are treated as property, 
like in the majority of states.  At least one Indiana court has recognized the 
gravity to couples of the division of their pets:  
Were we to judge the importance of these proceedings by 
such a fictitious standard of value we would be inclined to 
resent this appeal as a trespass on the court’s time and an 
imposition on our patience, of which quality we trust we are 
possessed in reasonable degree.  But we have in mind 
Senator Vest’s immortal eulogy on the noble instincts of a 
dog so we approach the question involved without any 
feeling of injured dignity but with a full realization that no 
man can be censured for the prosecution of his rights to the 
full limit of the law when such rights involve the comfort 
derived from the companionship of man’s best friend. 
Akers v. Sellers, 54 N.E.2d 779, 779 (Ind. App. 1944). 
17.  IND. CODE § 31-9-2-98 (2016).  This provision is particularly relevant 
to vested versus non-vested pensions and retirement plans. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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1.  Pensions 
Pensions must be vested in order to be subject to division 
in an Indiana divorce.18  A non-vested pension plan will not be 
considered a marital asset in Indiana, unlike in some other 
states.19  However, “if the right to such benefits is fixed, such 
benefits are a valuable asset [for division] even though there is 
no present right to receive income.”20 
The question of when a pension vests can be unclear.  
Indiana case law offers some help in this regard.  In one case, 
the Indiana Court of Appeals has determined that a clear test 
is whether a person can receive pension payments; in that case, 
because the husband could currently receive payments from his 
pension plan, the pension constituted divisible property.21  In 
another case, the husband’s “interest in the employer-
contributed portion of his 401(k) plan was contingent upon his 
retirement at the company.  Thus, [the husband’s] interest was 
 
18.  See § 31-9-2-98(b).  See also Bingley v. Bingley, 935 N.E.2d 152, 155 
(Ind. 2010) (“[V]esting is both a necessary and sufficient condition for a right 
to a benefit to constitute an asset.”). 
19.  2 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 6:22 (3d 
ed. Supp. 2016).  Almost all states consider vested pensions as marital 
property.  Only a few states, including Indiana, exclude non-vested pensions 
from marital property division.  Id. at 140.  “There is no relevant distinction 
for equitable distribution purposes between retirement plans where the 
employer made all the contributions (noncontributory plans) and plans to 
which both the employee and employer contributed (contributory plans).”  Id.  
See also Moyars v. Moyars, 717 N.E.2d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 
20.  Moyars, 717 N.E.2d at 980.  Employee-funded IRA’s are subject to 
similar rules.  See, e.g., Wortkoetter v. Wortkoetter, 971 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2012), which states:   
[A]lthough the IRA was established by Husband before the 
marriage, most of the appreciation occurred during the 
marriage.  Additionally, the trial court was not required to 
set aside to Husband the value of the IRA, even though Wife 
made no contribution to its acquisition.  Rather, the trial 
court was required to follow the statutory presumption 
absent evidence that an equal division would not be just and 
reasonable.  We conclude that the court acted within its 
discretion when, in accordance with the statutory 
presumption, it declined to award Husband his IRA 
exclusively and, instead, equally divided all property of the 
parties. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
21.  Hill v. Hill, 863 N.E.2d 456, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
7
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not vested in the employer-contributed portion of the 
retirement plan.  An unvested interest in property is not 
divisible as a marital asset.”22 
In determining a property division, courts may consider 
whether, and to what extent, the spouse acquired the pension 
prior to the marriage.  Tax penalties for early withdrawal from 
the pension plan can also be considered.23  Valuing a pension 
can be difficult and there are several approaches.24 
 
22.  Harris v. Harris, 690 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).   
23.  See Qazi v. Qazi, 546 N.E.2d 866, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (finding 
that it was reasonable to allow husband to keep possession of his retirement 
account in order to avoid the tax consequences of liquidating prior to 
retirement age; in order to offset this distribution, husband was ordered to 
pay scheduled cash payments to wife over time).  But see Irvine v. Irvine, 685 
N.E.2d 67, 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).  Unlike the situation in Qazi, where the 
court found that the tax consequences of the distribution were speculative, 
the Irvine court found that the tax consequences were not speculative 
because the trial court had ordered husband to pay an immediate lump sum 
amount to wife, rather than scheduled payments spread out over time.  Id.  
The Court stated that:  
 
review of the assets of the parties subject to a division under 
the terms of the agreement reveals approximately $150,000 
in cash—leaving almost a $250,000 difference [since 
husband was ordered to pay wife lump sum amount of 
$392,385 in case]. In order for [husband] to immediately 
obtain $250,000 in cash, [husband] would have to liquidate 
his $614,348.12 pension plan . . . [T]here are not sufficient 
assets in the marital pot to allow [husband] to meet the trial 
court’s plan of immediate distribution without liquidating 
his pension plan. Rather, the terms of the trial court’s 
distribution plan necessarily require [husband] to liquidate 
the plan. Therefore, the tax consequences of early 
liquidation were not speculative and should have been 
considered. 
Id. 
24.  The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Gray v. Gray stated: 
 
There are several ways of valuing a pension plan.  One is 
the “immediate offset” method, which is advocated by Dan 
Gray in this case and which consists of reducing the lifetime 
value of the pension benefits to present value and awarding 
the marital share of that present value to the non-owning 
spouse in the form of cash or other property.  The other 
method is the “deferred distribution” method, where the 
trial court does not divide the pension immediately but 
instead determines a percentage of the monthly pension 
benefit that the non-owning spouse is entitled to; the non-
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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Most future earnings of contingent benefits are also not 
divisible in Indiana.  These include workers’ compensation 
benefits intended to replace future wages, eventual proceeds 
from pending personal injury actions, and many disability 
pensions.25  Similarly, educational degrees are not divisible in 
most states, including Indiana.26  This is consistent with the 
general clean break principle in family law.27 
 
2.  Marital Home 
Similar to pensions and other retirement benefits, the 
marital home is a major portion of a couple’s property.  In 
dividing the home, courts may examine who earned the marital 
house, whether it was earned before the marriage, or whether 
there was commingling of the parties’ assets to pay the 
 
owning spouse then enjoys that share when the owning 
spouse begins drawing retirement.   
Gray v. Gray, 101 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Ark. 2003) (citations omitted).  Like with 
anything, there are advantages and disadvantages to each.  Id. (outlining the 
advantages and disadvantages of both approaches). 
25.  The Supreme Court of Indiana has stated: 
[A] future income stream may be a marital asset to the 
extent that either marital assets were used to acquire the 
future income or the income is future compensation for past 
services, as opposed to replacement for lost earning capacity 
due to disability.  But if both factors are absent, a disability 
income stream is not a marital asset.   
Severs v. Severs, 837 N.E.2d 498, 500 (Ind. 2005).   
26.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Roberts, 670 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1996); Lauren F. Redman, Domesticity and the Texas Community Property 
System, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L. J. 23, 28 (2008). 
27.  Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A 
Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1209-10 (1999) (“[T]he 
law currently expresses a preference for a ‘clean break’ at divorce.”).  See also 
Caddo v. Caddo, 468 N.E.2d 593, 593-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), which stated: 
In its division of property the [trial] court awarded the 
marital residence to the wife and awarded the husband 
$24,000, “[s]aid payment to be non-interest bearing until 
due and payable and to become due and payable upon the 
happening of the first of the following contingencies: Wife 
remarries; The marital home is sold; or, The youngest child 
becomes emancipated.”   
Id.  The Appellate court found “that expressing this contingency in terms of 
‘emancipation’ renders the judgment too uncertain to meet” the objective 
“that property rights be settled with certainty at the time of the dissolution.”  
Id. at 594.  
9
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mortgage or make improvements.28  In Indiana, the marital 
home is divisible and may be sold to facilitate an appropriate 
distribution of property.29 
However, there is always the argument that the custodial 
parent should keep the home so that the children do not have 
to relocate.  Thus, a factor that may affect the award of the 
marital home is the “desirability of awarding the family 
residence or the right to dwell in the family residence.”30  This 
is in line with the national trend of limiting post-divorce 
changes for children,31 with the goal being to protect the 
 
28.  See Brett Turner, Unlikely Partners: The Marital Home and the 
Concept of Separate Property, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 69 (2006).  
Turner states:  
 
This article will examine the current state of American 
matrimonial law on classification and division of the marital 
home.  It will conclude that the general rule set forth in the 
case law is correct.  The marital home should not always 
constitute marital property; rather, it should be classified 
under the same set of rules that apply to other assets.  
Treating the marital home as marital property will not 
result in a better division of the marital home between 
divorcing spouses. It will instead provide a strong incentive 
for spouses who own separate property to avoid investing 
that property in the marital home—a result which will 
harm all families, married as well as divorced. When all 
consequences are properly considered, a better policy result 
is reached by rejecting special rules of classification aimed 
only at the marital home. 
Id. at 69-70 (citations omitted).  On the issue of commingling, see infra Part 
II.B.2. 
29.  See IND. CODE § 31-15-7-4 (2016). 
30.  See IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(3) (2016). 
31.  27C C.J.S. DIVORCE § 958 (2017) (“The homestead may be awarded 
to the custodial parent, either unrestricted as to time, or until emancipation 
of the children or the youngest child reaches a specified age.”).  See also Lee 
R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Effect of Trial Court Giving 
Consideration to Needs of Children in Making Property Division, 19 A.L.R.4th 
239 (1983).  Russ stated:  
[C]ourts have considered the needs of the parties’ children 
in determining how the parties’ marital property should be 
divided. . . . In disposing of the family home, which is often 
the sole or major asset of the parties, the courts have 
considered such factors as the need of the parties’ children 
for a stable environment during the time of the parents’ 
divorce, the desirability of keeping the children in the same 
school, the fact that mortgage payments are often less than 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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children implicated by a divorce.32 
Indiana courts have split on the question of whether the 
house should be awarded to the custodial parent.  In one case, 
it was “a just and reasonable division of property” to “allow 
Wife to remain in the marital residence for the benefit of the 
parties’ children.”33  However, while it may be desirable to 
award the marital home to the custodial parent, the court need 
not necessarily do it.34  Indeed, the outcomes of divorce cases on 
this topic vary.35  Occasionally, there is a transition period to 
allow one spouse time to move or to permit home repairs.36  
 
what the custodial parent would pay for similar housing, 
and the financial ability of the parties to maintain two 
households, and have reached, under the particular 
circumstances of each case, differing conclusions as to the 
propriety of awarding the custodial parent the exclusive 
right to use the family home during the minority of the 
children or for other periods of time. 
Id. at §§1[a], 2[a] (citations omitted). 
32. See, e.g., Kara Francis, A Remedy Beyond Reach: The Stringent 
Standard in Illinois for Exclusive Possession of the Marital Home During 
Divorce Proceedings, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 803 (2014) (offering a useful 
discussion on the need to grant one party exclusive possession of the marital 
home in certain high-conflict divorce situations while dissolution proceedings 
are underway). 
33. Krasowski v. Krasowski, 691 N.E.2d 469, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).   
34. In re Marriage of Rupp, 449 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).   
35. See Swinney v. Swinney, 419 N.E.2d 996, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), 
which stated: 
[While] custody may well be enough by itself to support the 
custodial parent’s use of the family residence for a period of 
time, [the court] feel[s] that fact alone will not support an 
award of the residence to the wife when the residence is, in 
essence, the sole marital asset. Without some other 
offsetting factor, such an award is not just and reasonable.  
Id.  
36. The Court of Appeals of Indiana in Keown v. Keown stated: 
The trial court ordered [wife] to make the repairs because 
they were “necessary for sale.”  Thus, the repair costs are a 
direct result of the trial court’s order requiring [wife] to sell 
the residence . . . It was within the trial court’s discretion to 
determine whether to reduce the marital property’s value by 
this amount after determining that the repairs were 
necessary for sale. 
Keown v. Keown, 883 N.E.2d 865, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).  See also Webb v. 
Schleutker, 891 N.E.2d 1144, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (allowing a wife to 
remain living in the marital home for three months after the final 
dissolution).  
11
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Thus, the courts have discretion to order the residence to be 
sold.37 
 
B. Property Division Methods 
The second question regarding property division is how to 
divide the property once it is identified.  The main guideline is 
fairness to the divorcing spouses.38  Lawmakers have 
implemented different approaches to achieving fairness in 
divorce. 
 
1. General Approaches 
Legislators around the world have searched for the 
meaning of fairness in property division at divorce.  There are 
two main approaches in the United States: equitable division 
and community property.39 
A minority of states utilize community property, under 
which approach spouses hold property together during the 
marriage.40  At divorce, this often results in an equal property 
 
37.  See, e.g., Herron v. Herron, 457 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1983).  In that case, the wife claimed that the sale should be delayed for eight 
years while the children were still in the home.  Id.  However, this would 
have required husband to “continue making house payments in the interim, 
in addition to child support payments.”  Id.  The house was the most valuable 
asset to be divided, with relatively little other property to be divided.  Id.  
(“Thus, the court could not have awarded [wife] the house outright without 
giving her the lion’s share of the marital property.”); see also Melissa J. 
Avery, The Marital Residence and Other Black Holes: Dealing with Real 
Estate in Divorce, 53 RES GESTAE 30 (October 2009) (describing the options 
available for disposition of the marital residence, particularly when the 
housing market was performing poorly; the options discussed include sale of 
the home, refinance of the mortgage in order to buy out one spouse, or sale of 
the property at auction). 
38.  See Ryznar, supra note 12, at 117. 
39.  The details vary by state.  See, e.g., Mary Moers Wenig, Increase in 
Value of Separate Property During Marriage: Examination and Proposals, 23 
FAM. L. Q. 301, 303 (1989). 
40.  Wendy Goffe, Yours, Mine and Ours: An Introduction to the Laws of 
the U.S. Community Property States, Remarks at Estate Planning 
Essentials: Marital Deductions Post-DOMA and Community Property (July 
9, 2014) (transcript available at http://files.ali-
cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/VCWB0709_chapter_02_thumb.p
df).  Goffe stated:   
Nine states use a community property system to determine 
ownership and management of property of married 
couples . . . This outline identifies those core principles and 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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division between the spouses.41 
However, most states are common law, where the spouses 
hold their property during the marriage separately by 
default.42  For these states, the principle that governs property 
division is equitable distribution, “which seeks an equitable, 
but not necessarily equal, division between the spouses;”43 in 
other words, fairness is sought in the property division.44 
Equitable distribution is like partnership dissolution:  
although the partners have a partnership stake, the stakes are 
not necessarily equal.45  At the dissolution, the partners receive 
shares equal to their contributions.46  In the marital context, 
however, contributions need not be financial and include child 
care.47 
In applying the equitable distribution approach, courts 
may consider the length of the marriage, the age and health of 
the spouses, as well as the vocational skills, income, liabilities, 
and needs of each spouse.48  Courts have significant discretion 
in property division, with their decisions often being fact-
specific.49 
 
points out the major variations in the different state 
systems. The outline addresses characterization of property 
as community or separate, management authority over the 
property by the spouses and, to a limited extent, creditor 
rights in the property.   
Id. at 39. 
41.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2550-56 (2017).  In the community 
property system, each spouse has an interest in the community property, as 
opposed to separate spousal property holdings.  Ira Mark Ellman, O’Brien v. 
O’Brien: A Failed Reform, Unlikely Reformers, 27 PACE L. REV. 949, 951 
(2007). 
42.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
43.  Ryznar, supra note 12, at 119.  
44.  Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine, 
41 A.L.R.4th 481 (1985).  See also 2 MARITAL PROP. L. § 43:1 (2d ed. 2016) 
(“Most jurisdictions have enacted statutes calling for property to be divided 
equitably, justly, fairly, or the like, without regard to which party holds legal 
title.”). 
45.  Ryznar, supra note 12, at 120.  TURNER, supra note 19, at § 8:1. 
46.  Ryznar, supra note 12, at 120.  
47.  Id. at 120-21.  See also TURNER, supra note 19, at § 8:10. 
48.  Ryznar, supra note 12, at 121.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-81-
82 (2016); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504 (2016).  See also 3 BRETT TURNER, 
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY, Appendix A (3d ed. Supp. 2016). 
49.  Ryznar, supra note 12, at 121.  
13
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However, debate continues regarding the fairest property 
division at divorce.50  Disagreement between spouses on this 
question has also fueled much litigation.51 
 
2.  Indiana Approach 
Some jurisdictions have defaulted to the meaning of 
equitable as equality between the spouses, with the 
opportunity to rebut an equal division.  These jurisdictions 
include some equitable distribution states, such as Indiana.52 
According to the Indiana family law code,”[t]he court shall 
presume that an equal division of the marital property between 
the parties is just and reasonable.”53  Thus, the Indiana 
legislature has decided that the starting point should be an 
equal division, and that courts should attempt to achieve it.54  
An equal property division can be reached by several 
arrangements of property.55 
 
50.  Id. at 120.  
51.  Id.  See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, No. FA96 0149562 S, 1998 WL 
161165 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998), aff’d, 757 A.2d 1225 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2000).  
52.  Katharine Baker, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
stated: 
Gradually, though, courts have reached consensus on an 
understanding of equitable.  It means equal—usually.  Over 
time, relying in part on norms from some community 
property states, in part on various theories of partnership 
and promise, but also just craving a baseline from which to 
operate, many states have developed presumptions of a 
fifty-fifty split.  Six states codify the fifty-fifty division 
presumption in their statutes, but many more have adopted 
the rules judicially.  
Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The 
Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 319, 334 (2012). 
53.  IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5 (2016).  
54.  The adoption of the yardstick of equality by the House of Lords in 
White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. (HL) 596, is among the most internationally 
recognized equality standards, resulting in London’s reputation as the capital 
of divorce in the world.  See Ryznar, supra note 12, at 115. 
55.  IND. CODE § 31-15-7-4 (b) states: 
  (b) The court shall divide the property in a just and 
reasonable manner by: 
(1) division of the property in kind; 
(2) setting the property or parts of the property over to one 
(1) of the spouses and requiring either spouse to pay an 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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However, either spouse may rebut the presumption of 
equal division.56  Specifically, there are five factors listed in the 
Indiana Code that may be presented to the court in order to 
rebut the presumption.57  The trial court should consider all of 
these statutory factors in dividing property, but need not 
 
amount, either in gross or in installments, that is just and 
proper; 
(3) ordering the sale of the property under such conditions 
as the court prescribes and dividing the proceeds of the sale; 
or 
(4) ordering the distribution of benefits described in IC 31-9-
2-98(b)(2) or IC 31-9-2-98(b)(3) that are payable after the 
dissolution of marriage, by setting aside to either of the 
parties a percentage of those payments either by 
assignment or in kind at the time of receipt.  
Id. 
56.  See, e.g., Weigel v. Weigel, 24 N.E.3d 1007, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) 
(“The burden of proving the value of marital assets is, and should be, on the 
parties to the dissolution.”) (quoting Houchens v. Boschert, 758 N.E.2d 585, 
588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)); Morgal-Henrich v. Henrich, 970 N.E.2d 207, 211 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“A party seeking to rebut the presumption of equal 
division of marital property bears the burden of proof in doing so.”); 14 J. 
ERIC SMITHBURN, INDIANA PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW § 10:17 (Supp. 2016) (“The 
burden is on the parties, not the court, to produce evidence of the value of the 
marital property at the dissolution hearing.”). 
57.  IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5 states: 
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the 
property, regardless of whether the contribution was income 
producing. 
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each 
spouse: 
(A) before the marriage; or 
(B) through inheritance or gift. 
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time 
the disposition of the property is to become effective, 
including the desirability of awarding the family residence 
or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods 
as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of 
any children. 
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as 
related to the disposition or dissipation of their property. 
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related 
to: 
(A) a final division of property; and  (B) a final determination 
of the property rights of the parties.  
Id.  See also SMITHBURN, supra note 56, at § 10:8 (providing a useful 
discussion of marital property division factors). 
15
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explicitly address all of them in every case.58 
The first statutory factor considers each spouse’s 
contribution to the acquisition of the property, regardless of 
whether the contribution produced income.59  The contribution 
to the marriage need not be financial, allowing courts to reward 
the caregiving role that one spouse may have undertaken in 
the marriage.60  This is a common feature in other state laws as 
well. 
The second factor to rebut an equal division in Indiana is if 
a spouse owned assets before the marriage, or received them 
through gift or inheritance.61  However, it may be difficult to 
 
58.  For example, in one case, an appellate court could not infer from the 
trial court’s orders: 
 
that it considered all of the statutory factors . . .  There is 
nothing in either order to suggest that the trial court 
considered the present economic circumstances of each 
spouse, the future earnings ability of each spouse, or the 
conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the 
disposition or dissipation of their property.   
Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  
Consequently, the Court found that the trial court had committed error and 
remanded the case.  Id. at 240. 
59.  IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(1) (2016).  
60.  For example, one Indiana court stated that:  
[t]he income-producing efforts and intangible contributions 
of both spouses unite to facilitate the acquisition of marital 
property. [Husband’s] contribution of a greater share of 
funds to the marriage does not necessarily mean that he 
made a larger contribution to the acquisition of the marital 
property.  Therefore, the trial court’s unequal division of 
marital property cannot be sustained on the rationale that 
[Husband] earned more income than [Wife] during the 
marriage. 
Maloblocki v. Maloblocki, 646 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).   
61.  IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(2) (2016).  Examples in Indiana case law of 
equal division being rebutted due to the origin of the property—whether 
premarital or an inheritance—include a case where the disputed funds were 
acquired 11 years before entering in a four-year marriage that were never 
commingled with other assets; on the contrary, the funds were earmarked 
specifically for future medical expenses arising out of a back injury.  Doyle v. 
Doyle, 756 N.E.2d 576, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).  In another case, the Indiana 
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s award of 63% of the total assets 
to the husband’s estate and only 37% of the assets to the wife when the 
husband had owned property worth approximately $440,000 before the 
marriage, and the wife owned property worth approximately $95,000 before 
the marriage.  Beard v. Beard, 758 N.E.2d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).  
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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apply this factor in cases of transmutation, which is when 
separate property changes its classification to marital property, 
or vice versa.62 
Transmutation can occur by agreement of the spouses, by 
retitling an asset in both spouses’ names, or by giving a gift to 
the other spouse.63  In a few states, transmutation may occur 
when both spouses use an asset owned separately by only one 
of the spouses.64  A common form of transmutation results from 
 
In another Indiana case, the court found that: 
while Husband brought various furnishings and personal 
items into the marriage, Wife also contributed furniture and 
curtains to the marriage.  There was no evidence 
documenting the value of the savings account at the time of 
the marriage aside from Husband’s unsubstantiated 
recollection, let alone whether it was even in existence at 
the time of the divorce. Indeed, the majority of the items 
Husband had acquired prior to the marriage and for which 
he now seeks compensation had long since vanished and 
presumably, in the twenty-five years since then, been 
replaced by items acquired jointly by the parties . . . It was 
within the trial court’s prerogative to determine that the 
value of the property Husband brought into the marriage 
was not of such great value as to substantially outweigh the 
other statutory factors and mandate an even greater 
disparity in the division of marital assets.  
Akers v. Akers, 729 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
62.  “Another factor that can complicate the classification of property is 
transmutation or commingling of separate property.”  Amanda Wine, 
Comment, Treatment of Personal Injury Awards During Dissolution of 
Marriage, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 155, 177 (2006). 
63.  Laura W. Morgan & Edward S. Snyder, When Title Matters: 
Transmutation and the Joint Title Gift Presumption, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. 
LAW. 335, 340 (2003). 
64.  See, e.g., id. at 341.  For example, in one Rhode Island case, a 
husband placed some furniture he had inherited from his father in storage, 
and some he placed in the marital home.  Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 851 
(R.I. 1986).  The court subsequently held that the furniture in storage was his 
separate property because he had inherited it, whereas the furniture in his 
marital home had transmuted into marital property because the wife also 
used it.  Id.  Consequently, the wife was awarded all of the furniture in the 
home.  Id.  In many cases of transmutation, however, courts analyze the 
intent of the spouses and whether they desired the transmutation.  For 
example, transmutation may be defeated by proof that separate deposits into 
marital accounts were made “as a matter of convenience, without the 
intention of creating a beneficial interest, and that the funds in the account 
originated solely in the separate property of the spouse who claims the 
separate interest.”  Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 808 N.Y.S.2d 352, 356 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (citations omitted).  
17
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the commingling of separate and marital property to the extent 
that they lose their identities, such as money in bank 
accounts.65  In such an event, all commingled property becomes 
marital property.66  Simply stated, separate and marital 
property are commingled when the two types of property are 
mixed together such that they lose their identities, making all 
the resulting property marital property.67 
Importantly, if a spouse can trace an existing asset 
through its mutations to its original separate property source, 
he or she may keep the asset as separate property.68  Tracing is 
essentially a procedure that determines the origin of 
commingled property or the source of funds used to acquire an 
asset during the marriage.  Property can be traced in several 
ways, depending on the methods permitted by each state.69  
Nonetheless, absent transmutation, a spouse could retain 
property at divorce that was owned before the marriage, or 
 
65.  J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 
FAM. L.Q. 219, 220 (1989). 
66.  Morgan & Snyder, supra note 63, at 341. 
67.  However, some courts will not apply this commingling rule if the 
separate property significantly outweighs the marital property, which is the 
de minimis exception.  See Oldham, supra note 65, at 220.  Therefore, if a 
spouse deposits $10 of marital money into a separate bank account holding 
$10,000 of the other spouse’s separate money, the courts will not consider the 
entirety of the account to have transmuted to marital property.  See id. at 
226.  
68.  In many states, the general rule is that commingled marital and 
separate funds become marital property unless a spouse can explicitly trace 
his or her separate property.  Indeed, the natural course of a marriage often 
unintentionally produces complex commingling situations that obscure the 
character of the assets.  See id. at 223-24.   
69.  See, e.g., Joan F. Kessler et al., Tracing to Avoid Transmutation, 17 
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 371 (2001).  The nine community property states 
have developed the most complex tracing rules, but these rules are also used 
in equitable distribution states.  Each state may also use different tracing 
techniques in different circumstances.  For example, a spouse may trace 
commingled property to separate property by showing that, at the time of 
purchase, there was no marital property, so the purchase must have 
necessarily been made with separate funds.  Similarly, the “total 
recapitulation” method permits a spouse to prove that a specific asset was 
purchased with separate funds by showing that marital expenses exceeded 
marital income over the entire course of the marriage.  Id. at 377.  
Alternatively, in “direct tracing,” the sole-owning spouse can produce records 
showing that a particular purchase was made with separate funds.  See, e.g., 
id.   
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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received through gift or inheritance. 
The third statutory factor in Indiana used to rebut an 
equal division of property upon divorce is the economic 
circumstances of each spouse after the divorce.70  This includes 
the desirability of awarding the family residence or its use to 
the spouse having custody of the children.71  This factor 
facilitates judicial discretion regarding the appropriate 
property division between divorcing spouses. 
The fourth factor to rebut an equal division upon divorce in 
Indiana is the spouses’ conduct during the marriage in regards 
to the disposition or dissipation of their property.72  Here, the 
vestiges of a fault regime are clear: bad behavior by a spouse 
used to impact property distribution at divorce.73  Although 
there are still a few states that continue to allow fault to 
influence the property division, Indiana has joined the majority 
that does not consider fault when dividing assets,74 except in 
the case of dissipation of marital assets.75  This illustrates the 
 
70.  IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(3) (2016). 
71.  See supra Part II. 
72.  IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(4) (2016).  
73.  Professor Cohen of Ono Academic College, Law School, stated: 
In family law, vagueness surrounds this term [“fault”].  
Nevertheless, “fault” can, in principle, be divided into three 
categories: “economic fault,” expressed by inappropriate 
economic behavior, such as lack of contribution to the family 
effort, waste of the family’s assets, etc.; “violent fault,” 
expressed in physical or psychological violence of one spouse 
towards the other; and, finally, “sexual fault,” expressed by 
inappropriate sexual behavior of one of the spouses, 
primarily a romantic extramarital relationship.  
Yitshak Cohen, Extramarital Relationships and the Theoretical Rationales 
for the Joint Property Rules—A New Model, 80 MO. L. REV. 131, 133-34 
(2015). 
74.  See Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Principles: A Farewell to Fault—
But What Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive 
Spouse?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 213, 218 n.29 (2001) (citing Peter Nash 
Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L. Q. 269, 
301-02 n.113 (1997)). 
75.  Nonetheless, the Indiana courts cannot take dissipation of assets to 
the extreme.  One Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial 
court’s decision, determining that: 
[t]he tenor of the court’s statement is punitive and reflects 
that the court considered Husband responsible for the 
breakup of the marriage.  However, the conduct of the 
parties during the marriage, aside from conduct relating to 
19
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uniqueness of economic fault, whose adverse effect on a spouse 
is worthy of a judicial remedy. 
The Indiana Court of Appeals has characterized waste and 
misuse of marital assets as the hallmarks of dissipation, noting 
that the frivolous or unjustified spending of marital assets, 
including the concealment of marital property, qualifies as 
dissipation: 
 
The test for dissipation is whether the assets 
were actually wasted or misused. . . . In 
determining whether dissipation has occurred, a 
court should consider: (1) whether the 
dissipating party had the intent to hide, deplete, 
or divert the marital asset; (2) whether the 
expenditure benefited the marital enterprise or 
was made for a purpose entirely unrelated to the 
marriage; (3) whether the transaction was 
remote in time and effect or occurred just before 
the filing of a divorce petition; and (4) whether 
the expenditure was excessive or de minimis.76 
 
 The final factor in rebutting equal division between 
divorcing spouses in Indiana is the earnings or earning ability 
of the parties as related to a final division of property and a 
final determination of the property rights of the parties.77  In 
this category, a spouse’s health issues78 or lengthy break from 
paid work to care for the family can have an impact on the 
property division.79  This last factor concedes that the concept 
 
the disposition or dissipation of property, is irrelevant to the 
court’s division of property.   
Norton v. Norton, 573 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing In re 
Marriage of R.E.G., 571 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).   
76.  Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) 
(citing Goodman v. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). 
77.  IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(5) (2016). 
78.  Irwin v. Irwin, 406 N.E.2d 317, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) 
(determining that the trial court did not err in considering the wife’s ill 
health, which was relevant to her earning ability and economic 
circumstances). 
79.  In re Marriage of Snemis, 575 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).  
Here, the trial court did not commit error by failing to award Husband more 
than 50 percent of the marital property, “considering Wife’s long hiatus from 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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of fairness cannot be distilled into an oversimplified formula, 
and equal division is not necessarily the fairest approach in 
light of certain facts specific to individual marriages. 
Thus, applying any of these factors may result in an 
unequal property division in an Indiana divorce.80  In other 
words, despite the presumption of equal division, a more 
nuanced approach is possible with the various statutory factors 
to rebut it. 
As a result, judges have significant discretion in Indiana 
on matters of property division, illustrating that an equal 
division may not achieve a fair result in every case.  The lower 
court must only provide its reasons for an unequal division,81 
which receives deference on appeal.82 
The division of assets between the spouses is final.  
Modification of a court’s property award is difficult.  Usually, 
there must be a significant reason, like fraud, for a court to set 
aside a property award.83 
 
 
 
the work force in order to serve as a homemaker, an exclusive role which 
Husband encouraged; Wife’s homemaking contributions to the marriage; her 
physical limitations and age; and Husband’s greater earning ability as a 
business owner.”  Id. 
80.  In one case, the appellate court affirmed an allocation of marital 
assets as consistent with these statutory factors, which supported an unequal 
property division.  See Hitchcox v. Hitchcox, 693 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1998).  The trial court determined that the wife merited more than an equal 
division of the marital property based on the extent to which she supported 
both parties during the marriage, that she had acquired “nearly all of the 
marital assets prior to the marriage, that her financial contributions to the 
maintenance of those assets exceeded [the husband’s] contributions, that 
some marital assets were disposed of in [the husband’s] unprofitable 
business, and that [the husband] now has some earning ability.”  Id. at 632.  
81.   See Berger v. Berger, 648 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) 
(“[T]he trial court may divide the marital property unequally provided the 
court sets forth its reasons for so doing.”).  See also Campbell v. Campbell, 
993 N.E.2d 205, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“A trial court may deviate from an 
equal division so long as it sets forth a rational basis for its decision.”).   
82.  See, e.g., Love v. Love, 10 N.E.3d 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).   
83.  See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-15-7-9.1 (2016) (“(a) The orders concerning 
property disposition entered under this chapter (or IC 31-1-11.5-9 before its 
repeal) may not be revoked or modified, except in case of fraud.  (b) If fraud is 
alleged, the fraud must be asserted not later than six (6) years after the order 
is entered.”). 
21
  
610 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
C.  Alimony 
Alimony, known as spousal support or maintenance in 
some states including Indiana, is the payment of a lump sum or 
on a continuing basis by one spouse for the support and 
maintenance of the other spouse after divorce.84  It is awarded 
in addition to property division and child support.  Although it 
has gendered roots, either spouse may receive maintenance at 
divorce today.85 
Alimony has become unpopular in many states, with limits 
placed on its availability.  For example, in Indiana, 
maintenance is available only in three circumstances: 1) for as 
long as a spouse cannot support himself or herself due to a 
physical or mental incapacity, 2) for as long as appropriate 
when a spouse cannot support himself or herself due to a 
physically or mentally incapacitated child, or 3) up to 3 years of 
“rehabilitative maintenance” based on a) the educational level 
of each spouse, b) interruptions in a spouse’s education, 
training, or employment based on homemaking or caregiving 
responsibilities, c) “the earning capacity of each spouse,” and d) 
“the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education 
or training to enable the spouse who is seeking maintenance to 
find appropriate employment.”86  This represents the trend of 
limits placed on alimony by state legislatures in recent years. 
Courts often prefer property division to alimony because it 
provides a clean break.87  Unlike an alimony award, a property 
 
84.  See, e.g., 24A AM. JUR. 2D DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 668 (Supp. 
2017). 
85.  In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that Alabama’s sex-based alimony law, reflecting unjustified stereotypes, 
violates equal protection.  See id.  
86.  IND. CODE § 31-15-7-2 (2016).  However, this provision has not 
eliminated litigation on maintenance.  For example, in the time period 
between October 1, 2012 and September 30, 2013, litigants brought several 
cases on maintenance in the Indiana courts.  See, e.g., Banks v. Banks, 980 
N.E.2d 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Alexander v. Alexander, 980 N.E.2d 878 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012).   
87.  See, e.g., Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at 
Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1209-10 
(1999).  Professor Bryan stated:   
[T]he law currently expresses a preference for a “clean 
break” at divorce.  At most, the wife is entitled to short-term 
rehabilitative maintenance; judges disfavor permanent 
maintenance because the wife’s continued dependence on 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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award is not ongoing.  Although it is not always easy for one 
spouse to be awarded alimony, modification or termination by 
the other spouse is difficult.88 
 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
  
Given this legal framework, the next step is to examine 
whether Indiana judicial decisions stay within this framework.  
In other words, the question is how the courts apply the 
statutory law.  While individual cases have been decided on 
these issues, no data analysis on a compilation of them has 
been done.  Yet, such an analysis is important because it shows 
the level of discretion courts use and how they use it. 
 
 
her husband interferes with the clean break between 
spouses.  Wives, or their attorneys, cannot successfully 
negotiate for maintenance that judges will not award. 
Id.  See also Theresa Glennon, Still Partners?  Examining the Consequences 
of Post-Dissolution Parenting, 41 FAM. L. Q. 105 (2007).  Professor Glennon of 
Temple University stated: 
The coparenting approach to post-dissolution parenting falls 
into sharp conflict with the economic clean break model, 
under which divorced persons and cohabitants who part 
ways are entirely separate individuals, unencumbered by 
ongoing legal or financial relationships, free to build new 
lives and make a fresh start.  Under this view, alimony after 
divorce is disfavored, and new economic disadvantages that 
arise from events that occur post-divorce are legally 
irrelevant. 
Id. at 105-06.  
88.  See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-15-7-3 (2016): 
Provisions of an order with respect to maintenance ordered 
under section 1 of this chapter (or IC 31-1-11.5-9(c) before 
its repeal) may be modified or revoked. Except as provided 
in IC 31-16-8-2, modification may be made only: 
(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial 
and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or 
(2) upon a showing that: 
(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child 
support that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from 
the amount that would be ordered by applying the child 
support guidelines; and 
(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued 
at least twelve (12) months before the petition requesting 
modification was filed. 
Id.  
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A.  The Empirical Data 
 The data for this Article consists of divorces filed during 
three months in 2008 in Marion County, Indiana that involved 
minor children.89  The number of these cases totaled 
approximately 110.90 
 These divorce records were coded for multiple variables.  
These include who filed for the divorce, who received the 
marital home, how the pension was divided, how many 
children resulted from the marriage, who received custody of 
the children, and how parenting time was divided.91 
In approximately half of the cases in the sample, the 
marital home was owned.92  There was no guaranteed link 
between child custody and the award of the home or its use.93 
Approximately half of the couples in the sample had a 
pension to divide.94  In approximately half of the couples with 
pensions, each member of the couple had an individual 
pension.  In the vast majority of these cases, each member kept 
the full amount of that pension.  In other words, pensions were 
generally not divided if each member of the couple had a 
pension.  In many of the remaining couples with pensions, only 
one member of the couple had a pension, and it was divided 
between the divorcing spouses, often with each spouse taking 
half.95 
 When it comes to spousal support, out of the 
approximately 110 cases, the courts awarded it only in three 
cases.96  All of the recipients of these awards were women.97 
 
B.  The Implications 
Given the statutory background, the question is how the 
courts have been dividing property between divorcing couples 
 
89.  The data are on file with the author [hereinafter Data on file with 
author]. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Data on file with author, supra note 89.  
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. 
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in the pursuit of fairness.  Many people’s wealth consists of two 
major assets: the marital home and retirement funds; thus, it 
is important to look at the data regarding these two factors 
when considering property division at divorce.98 
 As seen in the empirical data, the custodial parent did not 
necessarily receive the marital home.  Thus, despite the option 
to link the house to child custody, courts more directly 
addressed children in child support determinations. 
 Regarding their retirement, divorcing spouses were 
generally able to keep their own pensions in full if both of them 
had a pension.  Otherwise, the pension would often be divided 
equally between the divorcing spouses.  This shows not only 
that the courts adhered to the Indiana legislature’s 
understanding of fairness as an equal property division, but 
also that the proper division often required splitting the 
pension when there was only one. 
Despite the trend towards equal property division, there 
was no formulaic approach that the Indiana courts generally 
used to divide the property between the spouses to achieve an 
equal distribution.  It is clear that the details of the property 
division remained in the discretion of the courts today in 
Indiana, as in many other states. 
The Indiana courts were far more mechanical in limiting 
spousal support, applying the restrictions set forth in the 
Indiana Code.  Spousal support was awarded in only a few 
cases, with Indiana joining those states limiting it to special 
circumstances. 
In sum, Indiana courts followed legislative guidance, both 
in terms of reducing maintenance and starting the property 
division at an equal division.  While predictability and 
consistency are gained by legislative formulae, the courts can 
accomplish individual justice in divorce cases by having 
significant discretion, as seen through the property awards.99  
 
98.  See supra Part II. 
99.  “In deciding between a system of fixed rules and one of judicial 
discretion in family law disputes, the key issue on which to focus is the extent 
to which the family law system provides justice for the individual parties.”  
Theodore K. Cheng, A Call for a New Fixed Rule: Imposition of Child Support 
Orders Against Recipients of Means-Tested Public Benefits, 1995 ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 647, 653 (1996). 
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Furthermore, although the Indiana legislature has decided 
that an equal division is fairest to the divorcing couple, an 
equal property division can be reached by several 
arrangements of property, over which the courts maintained 
their discretion. 
Indeed, individual justice is the aim of divorce law.  Yet, 
the standard for property division in divorce is fairness, and 
there is no universal equation or definition of fairness.100  Thus, 
legislative intervention in family law formulae has its limits 
because the facts vary among divorce cases.101  While it is 
relatively straightforward to legislate an equal property 
division starting point, it is far more difficult to legislate 
beyond this because there are so many different property 
scenarios. 
This necessarily preserves a role for the judiciary.  
Creating completely formulaic rules to property division at 
divorce, devoid of any judicial discretion, would be a major 
departure from the current law and would require a 
reimagining of the current approach to family law.102  Indeed, 
family law is on the bridge between legislative formula and 
judicial discretion, with a role for each. 
In addition to the role for the judiciary, there is a role for 
contracting by a couple, albeit with the court’s oversight.  Even 
couples with a settlement agreement must receive approval 
from the courts.103  Just as the government regulates 
 
100.  See supra Part II. 
101.  But see Cheng, supra note 99, at 647 (“Throughout the 1980s, there 
was a growing consensus that the broad judicial discretion exercised in family 
law disputes was causing dire socio-economic consequences for the parties 
involved and undermining the orderly and equitable resolution of disputes in 
child custody, child support, alimony, and property distribution.”).   
102.  For an excellent discussion of the reimagining family law, see JILL 
ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED (2014).  
103.  Professor Sharp of University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
stated:  
Within the past two decades, however, there has been an 
even greater demand for a minimizing of such state 
intervention and for a more unfettered application of simple 
contract principles to marital agreements . . . Separation 
agreements . . . have tended to be swept into both the 
argument and the conclusion that marital contracts should, 
in general, be accorded the same judicial treatment as any 
other contract.  
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
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marriage,104 it regulates divorce. 
Nonetheless, couples enjoy strong contractual autonomy in 
the United States,105 and they have an incentive to use it in the 
current legal framework.  As seen in the empirical analysis, it 
is far easier to predict that a property division will resemble an 
equal division than how that division will be achieved.  The 
court’s priority is to get an equal division, rather than any 
particular division.  If couples want a particular property 
division guaranteed, then they should enter into a premarital 
agreement.  However, often people’s optimism about marriage 
prevents them from entering into such agreements.106 
Alternatively, couples might be encouraged to settle their 
divorce after their marriage ends, instead of before, to retain 
control.  These empirical results help illustrate for them what 
is fair in the property division according to the Indiana courts 
in the context of the statutory framework. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article analyzes empirical data from divorce cases 
filed during three months in 2008 involving children in Marion 
County, Indiana to find patterns in the outcomes of divorce 
cases on property division, particularly in regard to retirement 
savings and the marital home.  The goal is to examine not only 
what the courts are doing in family law, but also to highlight 
the underlying law to determine the correlation between the 
family law code and judicial outcomes. 
The results of this empirical work are a helpful glimpse 
into the meaning of justice in divorce cases today.  While it 
 
Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A 
Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1401-03 
(1984). 
104.  For example, relatives closer than first cousins cannot marry, and 
first cousins can marry only once they reach sixty-five years of age.  IND. 
CODE § 31-11-1-2 (2016).  Other government regulations and restrictions on 
marriage have fallen over the decades.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding state bans on same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding state bans on 
interracial marriage unconstitutional).   
105.  See Ryznar & Stepień-Sporek, supra note 14. 
106.  See Williams, supra note 3, at 738. 
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does seem that Indiana courts are following the state statutes 
limiting maintenance awards and using an equal division as a 
starting point, there is no easy formula or pattern to predict 
exact property divisions.  If couples want more predictability, 
they should enter into agreements, either at the beginning or 
end of their marriage.  These lessons hold for many other 
states who have a similar legal framework as Indiana. 
The results of an empirical analysis can help shape the 
policy debate and inform state legislators who might want to 
see how their laws are being implemented.  Most importantly, 
they can help judges know what is happening in the landscape 
of family law, such as whether they are being consistent and 
whether they are doing justice in the way that they would like. 
 
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/5
